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"'There is an embarrassment ... about trying to force people to have 
freedom."' 1 This statement, given in 19'43 by Stringfellow Barr, a member of 
the General Advisory Committe on Reeducation for the State Department, 
proved to be prophetic for the reeducation and denazification efforts of the 
United States in post-war Germany. Faced with a lack of consensus about 
policy goats, a severe shortage of resources, a scarcity of qualified Germans 
untainted by National Socialism, and a decimated educational infrastructure, 
the direct results of reeducation were predestined to be meager. However, if 
democracy was to take root and flourish in Germany this time around, these 
efforts were critical. Experience had shown that the mere establishment of 
the outward forms of democratic government was worthless -- what was 
needed was an inner spirit to give them meaning. This was the task of 
reeducation. 
The first battle to be faced in creating a reeducation policy for Germany 
was to resolve the ongoing conflict over the fundamental purpose of the 
Occupation. Due to intense rivalry between the various branches of 
government (and Roosevelt's increasing inability to impose order as his illness 
progressed), "the Washington bureaucratic maze in World War II was not 
conducive to developing consistent or logical plans for the Occupation, and all 
face ts of national policy, including the notion of reeducation, suffered 
accordingly."2 The main struggle was between those who favored 
rehabilitation, including most State Department officials, and those who 
advocated punitive measures, for whom Treasury Secretary Henry 
Morgenthau, Jr. was the most prominent spokesman. From the beginning this 
2 
conflict was embedded in the very heart of the policy directives issued for the 
governing of Occupied Germany. According to JCS 1067, issued in April of 
1945, the basic objective of Military Government was 
to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the 
peace of the world. Essential steps in the accomplishment of this 
objective are the elimination of Nazism and militarism in all their 
forms, the immediate apprehension of war criminals for 
punishment, the industrial disarmament and demilitarization of 
Germany, with continuing control over Germany's capacity to 
make war, and the preparation for an eventual reconstruction of 
German political life on a democratic basis.3 
Thus, while immediate attention was focused on negative measures 
such as denazification, demilitarization, and deindustrialization, the ultimate 
goal was democratization. On the whole, however, JCS 1067 reflected the 
desire of the Morgenthau clique to ensure the pastoralization of Germany and 
its inability to ever wage war again. Examples of these provisions include 
directives that "no action will be taken in execution of the reparations 
program or otherwise which would tend to support living conditions in 
Germany or in your zone on a higher level than that existing in any one of the 
neighboring United Nations,"4 or, even more bluntly, that "you will take no 
steps (a) looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or (b) 
designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy."5 
However, as the importance of Germany for Europe's economic recovery 
became evident, it was recognized that the philosophy behind Morgenthau·s 
proposals was one of revenge rather than practicality. 6 His influence, although 
still considerable, waned steadily, and his dismissal under Truman cleared the 
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way for a more reconstructionist approach. From then on, the obstacles had 
more to do with resources than policy. 
These obstacles could be severe. In May of 1945, there were only ten 
education officers in the Control Council to administer the critical operations of 
denazifying and reviving a zonal educational system for nearly twenty million 
people.7 That this was a severe underallocation of resources, especially in 
light of the importance that was placed on reeducation and denazification, is 
clear . In December of 1945 a report was issued that wryly remarked that "the 
best that could be said for the American effort to date was that its ongoing 
'shortage of staff .. . contributed indirectly to a further development of local 
German enterprise ."'8 
This was compounded by (and partially a result of) the low status held 
by Education and Religious Affairs , which was in charge of these operations. It 
remained a "mere section " until January of 1946, when it became a branch, 
but it was not until March of 1948 that it became a full division.9 Lacking a 
prominent spokesperson in either the Military Government or in Washington , 
E&RA faced a continual shortage of manpower and funds. It is true, however, 
that this was the case throughout the military bureaucracy and General Lucius 
Clay, the regional commander, wisely realized that priority went to alleviating 
the massive malnutrition which threatened the German people. 
There was one area in which policy proved to be more of an obstacle 
than resources , and that was denazification. "Denazif ication proved to be a 
, 
source of unending dissatisfaction in Military Government. All Occupation 
personnel supported it in principle as indispensible to the creation of a 
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healthier society. It was the precondition to the positive programs desired by 
the reconstructionists. Yet, in practice, denazification proved impossible to 
execute with the limited Military Government resources on hand."18 The 
problem was especially acute in education. It was recognized in SWNCC 
269/5, the Long-Range Policy Statement on German Reeducation prepared by 
the State Department, that for both practical and ideological considerations 
any effective reform of education must come from the Germans themselves; 
there were nowhere near enough E&RA personnel to supervise)much less 
conductJinstruction, and participation by the Germans was crucial for lasting 
results. 11 However, all male and most female teachers had been required to 
join the Nazi Party, and even if they had only been "nominal participants" in 
National Socialism, they could still be forbidden "to be active as a teacher, 
preacher, editor, author, or radio commentator.'' 12 
Whether or not they would actually be banned depended upon a 
number of factors, but often the most prominent was the state of public 
opinion back in the United States. The degree of rigor to which denazification 
was carried out was in a state of constant flux, "depending on which pressure 
Military Government felt most keenly at the moment: the desire to preserve 
trained personnel or the fear of criticism by the American public.''13 On the 
one hand was the basic policy of denazification, proclaimed by the Potsdam 
agreement as one the the fundamental purposes by which the Four-Power 
Control Council would be guided, and on the other was the need for trained 
and competent German leaders to supply the immediate hands-on direction 
the Military Government simply did not have the resources to provide. 
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However, the total pervasiveness of National Socialism was such that it was 
usually impossible to find sufficient staff who were totally uncompromised. 
In October of 1945, after some particularly stinging press criticism of 
allegedly lax denazification efforts, a new law, Military Government Directive 
No. 8, encouraged the consideration of cases under the most stringent terms 
possible. People were banned from holding any post, in government or 
industry, for any sort of connection with National Socialism, whether active or 
nominal; while this was not strictly required by the letter of the law, the 
political environment was such that most officials would have rather been 
accused of being overzealous than of coddling Nazis. Under this law, 70 to 90 
percent of all teachers were dismissed by November of 1947.14 Obviously, 
this had a serious impact on the ability of the Education and Religious Affairs 
Bra.nch to carry out school reopenings. 
The scope of the denazification program soon grew to the point where 
Military Government could not handle it all. Some thirteen million 
Fr11ge/Jogen (questionnaires on political activities before and during the Nazi 
regime) were returned to headquarters, where each was to be carefully 
investigated and the appropriate action taken. 15 Three measures were taken 
to attempt to attack the growing piles of Fr11ge/Jogen which began piling up 
in hallways, closets, and cellers: First, an amnesty was granted to those born 
after January 1, 1919, unless they could be classified as Major Off enders or 
Offenders;16 a second to those whose incomes had been less than 3,600 Reichs 
Marks during the Nazi regime and "who therefore were not regarded as the 
beneficiaries of the vast looting of German industry undertaken by Goering 
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and other Nazi leaders;" and a third to the disabled. These three actions cut 
down the size of the problem immensely, but some two million active cases 
remained to be processed. 17 
Thus, the denazification corps was forced to resort to the same 
expedient as every other Military Government agency; they began to employ 
the Germans themselves to rule on denazification cases. This was authorized 
by the Law for the Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism of 5 
March 1946 (German Law 104), in which the Military Government 
magnanimously declared it had "decided that the German people may share 
the responsibility for liberation from National Socialism and Militarism in all 
fields."18 Problems cropped up almost immediately. In contrast to Military 
Government Law No. 8, German Law 104 approached denazification as a 
process of rehabilitation rather than a purge, with the results that after five 
months the German tribunals had examined 583,985 cases and dismissed 
530,907 of them without trial. Out of the two million active cases, only 
930,000 were ever brought to trial and only 1,549 were found guilty as major 
offenders. 19 
If the experience of the Military Government and the later German 
civilian tribunals offered any concrete lesimns, it was that the truth was 
extremely hard to discover. Personal testimony was notoriously unreliable. 
"After a few months of experience, most investigators and Military 
Government personnel grew wary of accusations and statements by 
individuals. After twelve years of political repression, followed by def eat, 
there were too many old scores to settle:· 20 The German people soon grew 
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alienated with a system they viewed as capricious and harsh. A 1945 
telegram to the Secretary of State summarized local reaction admirably: 
intelligence reports constantly suggest that while all non-Nazi 
Germans welcome our denazification policy, they are often critical 
of its application. They feel it is too 'schematic' and too rigid with 
insufficient provision for making numerous exceptions to the 
general rules. Germans usually feel that many persons who were 
only nominal Nazis are falling under the axe unjustly and that 
some active Nazis are being missed . . . There is apparently no 
agreement among Germans as to how far the denazification 
program should be carried. Two things seem chiefly to irritate 
them: What appears to their uncritical eyes to be mass 
discharges and penalties applied to all Party members regardless 
of individual merits of the case, and the unavoidable lack of 
uniformity in the application of the denazification policy in 
different localities. 21 
Many Americans had the same criticisms. 
In addition to the havoc caused by the denazification purges, E&RA had 
to contend with the physical devastation caused by the war and the lack of 
politically acceptable textbooks. In Bavaria, "virtually all the school buildings 
that had escaped destruction were now [May 1945] in use as billets, military 
hospitals, or displaced-persons camps."22 Elsewhere in the American Zone the 
situation was similar. The universities were particularly hard hit; the 
University of Munich required six months of heavy labor at reconstruction 
work before a student could begin studies.23 
The search for textbooks not thoroughly infused with Nazi ideology and 
militaristic nationalism posed even greater obstacles. None of the texts used 
during the Nazizeit could possible be used, and books from the Weimar 
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Republic were no longer to be found. Finally, in desperation, microfilmed 
copies of pre-Hitler te1tbooks were shipped over from the collection at 
Columbia Teachers College.24 Even these were far from ideal, as they tended 
to glorify nationalism and military conquest; however, it was felt that to 
censor them would make the Germans feel they were being handed Allied 
propaganda, so a disclaimer was inserted into each of these "emergency 
textbooks:" 
This textbook is one of a series which is being published by order 
of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force for 
emergency use in German schools in the area occupied by his 
forces. It has been selected after a thorough examination of 
many of the books in use in Germany before the Nazi accession to 
power. It is a textbook of German authorship and has been 
reprinted without textual alteration. Its issue does not imply that 
it is entirely suitable from an educational point of view or 
otherwise . It is merely the best book which could be found in the 
circumstances and must serve until Germany produces better 
textbooks of its own. 25 
Unfortunately , this was not to occur for some time ; locally produced textbooks 
were not to appear until 1947, and even then the amounts were severely 
limited due to paper shortages . 26 
Thus, the problems seemed to overwhelm even the most dedicated 
efforts at E&RA. All in all, the record of reeducation in post-war Germany is 
mixed; heroic efforts were intermingled with excessive interference and 
under allocation of resources to produce results not wholly satisfactory to 
anyone. The ultimate significance of the reeducation effort, however, may be 
much greater than the meager list of Occupation achievements might indicate; 
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the presence of a strong democratic nation forty years afterwards gives good 
prima facie evidence of lasting accomplishment. In any case, the attempt 
was inevitable. "[The Americans) had chosen not to eliminate the German 
people or to garrison the country permanently -- actions that would have 
been morally and practically impossible. It followed, therefore, that the 
United States must seek to change 'the mentality of the German people to the 
end that Germany ... [may) eventually be permitted to live without 
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